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Sovereignty under the Agreement on
Government Procurement
Paul J. Carrier*
Results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions clearly indicate invigorated efforts to establish a new world
order for international trade. First and foremost, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was established1 despite the failure
of the International Trade Organization (ITO) approximately a
half century ago. 2 Furthermore, five of nine plurilateral codes
and agreements (for which participation by GATT Contracting
Parties was partial) created during the Tokyo Round of multilat-
eral negotiations have now become full WTO disciplines.3 In ad-
dition, the WTO framework now includes comprehensive
agreements on formerly unchartered territory, including the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 4 the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),5 and a host of other agreements related to old and new
accords managed under the auspices of the WTO. The WTO
Members have also agreed to include the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU),6 which contains a comprehensive set of
* BA, University of Michigan; JD, Detroit College of Law at Michigan
State University; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. The author is
presently teaching international government procurement and GATT/WTO
courses at Comenius University School of Law, Slovak Republic, as a Fulbright
Fellow.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec.
15, 1993, reproduced as amended in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTs 6 (1995) [hereinafter Fi-
NAL RESULTS].
2. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MAcY 9-10, 44 (1975).
3. 1 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992)
1013 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993). The plurilateral accords that remain are
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement, the International Dairy Agreement, and the International Bovine
Meat Agreement. FINAL RESULTS, supra note 1, Annex 4, at 438.
4. FINAL RESULTS, supra note 1, Annex 1B, at 325.
5. Id., Annex 1C, at 365.
6. Id., Annex 2, at 404. The agreements to which the DSU applies are
listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU, with special rules and procedures for certain
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procedures and powers, not the least of which is the new "nega-
tive consensus" rule for rejecting panel reports and recommen-
dations of Dispute Settlement Bodies (DSBs) formed under the
DSU. 7 Of the four plurilateral trade agreements not yet incor-
porated as full WTO disciplines, the Agreement on Government
Procurement (AGP)8 is currently receiving the most attention.
Participation in the AGP by WTO Members is limited to
twenty-two countries, 9 representing slightly less than twenty
percent of WTO membership. Since its effective date in 1981,
the AGP has added only a handful of new participants. LO Argua-
bly, the major reason behind this lack of participation is the per-
ceived loss of sovereignty which naturally follows adherence to
the strictures of the AGP. 1" Even GATT 1947, the only accord to
survive the failure of the ITO, specificly excludes government
procurements from its coverage. 12 It is difficult to envision a
agreements listed in Appendix 2 or in the agreements themselves. Id., Annex 2,
at 429-30.
7. FINAL RESULTS, supra note 1, Annex 2, art 16.4, at 417 (panel reports
should be adopted absent timely appeal or unanimous consensus of the DSB to
refrain from adopting the report); id., art. 17.14, at 419 (requiring uncondi-
tional acceptance of an appellate report absent DSB consensus to refrain from
adopting an appellate report). Formerly, the adoption of GATT panel reports
was done by consensus, which meant that opposition by a single GATT Con-
tracting Party, even the country found to be in error, would prevent the adop-
tion of a report. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 65-
67 (1990) (describing the evolution of GATT dispute settlement procedures).
8. FINAL RESULTS, supra note 1, Annex 4, at 438 [hereinafter AGP].
9. See Amelia Porges, Introductory Note to the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1132 (1994).
10. Several countries (e.g., Greece and Spain) were added as the European
Community grew; Israel acceded in 1983. GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 35
(1984). Korea was compelled to join as the quid pro quo for agreement of cer-
tain countries to allow Korea to accede to WTO/GATT. Cf. Don Wallace, Jr.,
The Changing World of National Procurement Systems: Global Reformation, 4
PUB. PRocuREMENT L. REV. 57, 58 (1995) (noting the U.S. requirement of hav-
ing certain countries accede to the AGP before the U.S. would agree to those
countries' accession to the GATT/WTO). Singapore and Hong Kong, signatories
of the former version of the AGP, have not yet signed the most recent accord;
the former agreement therefore remains in effect as to these signatories. See
Porges, supra note 9, at 1132.
11. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note
3, at 1025-26 (listing reasons for protectionism in government procurement).
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], art. III,
8(a). GATT Article III:8(a) excludes procurements for government, as op-
posed to commercial or resale purposes, while subsection 8(b) permits the pay-
ment of subsidies to domestic producers from internally collected taxes via
government purchases of domestic products. Id. at 8(a)-(b). An early attempt
by the United States to include government procurement in the suggested char-
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more sovereign, trade-related act than the purchase of goods,
supplies, and services by a government with monies collected
primarily from its citizens for the purpose of funding govern-
ment operations and public welfare generally. The relationship
between sovereignty and government procurement is an inti-
mate one, and, as one scholar has quipped in relation to domes-
tic protectionism generally, "[dliscrimination in favor of local
products sometimes seems to be one of the basic human
urges."13
The purpose of this article is to assess the treatment of sov-
ereignty by the AGP with a view toward explaining the lack of
widespread participation, particularly with regard to developing
and lesser-developed countries. Proponents of complete WTO
Member participation in the AGP ultimately are faced with two
avenues. First, they can await the passage of enough time for
developing and least-developed countries to strengthen their
economic positions, which may alter their perception of gains
and losses in international trade. Alternatively, they can reform
the AGP, or use more aggressively its exceptions regarding de-
veloping and least-developed countries to encourage participa-
tion. This article begins with a discussion of sovereignty in the
context of government procurement. The second section consid-
ers how the various articles of the AGP treat sovereignty. The
article concludes by advocating the latter avenue mentioned
above in an effort to transform government procurement into a
full WTO discipline most rapidly.
I. SOVEREIGNTY, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
While an exhaustive analysis of sovereignty is beyond the
scope of this article, there are several significant points which
help explain national attitudes toward government procurement
policy. A basic understanding of these features provides a back-
drop with which to comprehend the various approaches to the
AGP and, particularly, the notable resistance on behalf of devel-
oping and least-developed countries to sign the Agreement. Fur-
thermore, even developed-country resistance to further
ter for an international trade organization was rejected. See UNITED STATES
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, EXEcuTrI BRANCH GATT STUDIES 1 (Comm.
Print 1974).
13. JoHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 274
(1969). See also THE GATT URUGUAY RoUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 1025 (describing government procurement as one of the most pro-
tected areas in international trade).
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liberalization of government procurement derives from these
same concerns.
The establishment of a framework for understanding sover-
eignty in the context of government procurement is also neces-
sary. As procurement becomes one of the most important issues
in international trade liberalization, 14 future analysis will be
aided by highlighting certain distinctions. For this reason the
following discussion distinguishes not only between internal and
external notions of sovereignty, but also between differing con-
ceptions of internal sovereignty. In turn, an analysis of sover-
eignty under the two general forms of public administration,
civil and common law systems, is required. 15 It is also helpful to
delineate the mechanisms by which sovereignty for external
purposes is waived or suspended. Finally, implicit throughout
the discussion that follows is the differentiation between sover-
eignty as it relates to government procurement in contrast to
other exercises of sovereign power. 16
A. SOVEREIGNTY GENERALLY
Sovereignty is defined as "[t]he supreme, absolute, and un-
controllable power by which any independent state is governed
14. The GATT's avowed purpose was to lower tariffs and quotas on goods
moving in international trade. Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule
of International Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39, 42 (1994). In this regard, the
GATT has been admirably successful. Tariff rates have fallen from a post-
World War II level of approximately forty percent to less than five percent.
Michael J. Trebilcock, On the Virtues of Dreaming Big But Thinking Small:
Comments on the World Trading System After the Uruguay Round, 8 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 291, 292 (1990). As these barriers have fallen worldwide, the "stumps and
boulders" of other non-tariff barriers, including restrictive government procure-
ment policies, have naturally been accentuated. Peter S. Watson, Chairman of
the U.S. International Trade Commission, The Framework for the New Trade
Agenda, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1237, 1241 (1994) (using the tariff lake
metaphor). See also JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 16,
37 (1990).
15. But see H. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunity of
Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 249 (1959) (warning against drawing
an artificial distinction between 'continental' and 'Anglo-American' practices of
absolute sovereign immunity in relation to foreign sovereigns); id. at 250-72
(providing case examples from a variety ofjurisdictions). Lauterpacht notes the
growing trend toward judicial recognition of a restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in external relations (res gestionis versus res imperii) as well as the
inconsistent adherence to concepts of absolute sovereign immunity. Id. at 220.
16. For example, there exists a wealth of scholarship on sovereign immu-
nity from tort suits and from government appropriations of foreign nationals'
property, as opposed to immunity offered for claims brought against the govern-
ment in the area of public purchasing. See dicussion infra Part I.A. for explana-
tion of the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign immunity.
[Vol. 6:67
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.. [t]he power to do everything in a state without accountability
... 17 As will be addressed below, sovereignty is made up of
both internal and external components. In earlier times, sover-
eignty was viewed as a divine right vested in a monarch who in
turn acted as the voice and the will of the general populace. By
the end of the eighteenth century, several western European
countries and the United States had already undergone signifi-
cant changes in the structure of government by dividing the sov-
ereign power into executive, parliamentary or legislative, and
judicial institutions. Although the distinctions with regard to
government contracting, and responsibility therefor, are often
blurred, all three institutions have roles to play.
Sovereign immunity is defined as "[a] judicial doctrine
which precludes bringing suit against the government without
its consent," and is "[flounded on the ancient principle that 'the
King can do no wrong.'"18 Sovereignty is the over arching princi-
ple of national self-governance. As noted above, sovereignty is
an uncontrollable power which has no equivalents and is there-
fore beyond censure or control unless it is waived. 19 As views on
government responsibility began to change in favor of recogniz-
ing a responsibility of the sovereign power to its constituents,
the task of reviewing the nature of that responsibility was
placed in part on the judiciary. 20
The best measure of the supremacy of sovereign power is
the extent to which it has been waived, i.e., the degree to which
it may be tested and even denied by the judicial branch. The
strength of sovereign power, then, in public purchasing or in any
other context, is the level of judicial review the sovereign enjoys.
Based on this intimate connection, a comprehensive discussion
of sovereignty cannot be undertaken without significant refer-
ence to judicial review. As is true of the concept of sovereignty,
the sovereign immunity doctrine also has internal and external
components.
17. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed., 1990). See also JAMES R. Fox,
DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw 410 (1992) ("the ability of
a state to act without external controls on the conduct of its affairs."). Note that
the focus of this definition is an external one.
18. BLAC's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1396; see also Fox, supra
note 17, at 410.
19. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1396.
20. Also addressed below, and especially in the context of continental gov-
ernment procurement systems, is the fact that countries often vest reviewing
authority in administrative bodies attached primarily to executive branches,
which dilutes the judiciary's role.
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1. Internal Sovereignty
The concept of internal sovereignty encompasses the rela-
tionship of citizen to sovereign as opposed to the relationship be-
tween nationals of another state and a sovereign or that of
sovereign to sovereign. This analysis begins with the historical
consideration of sovereign powers as they are exercised inter-
nally. Respect should be paid to culturally different conceptions
of sovereignty. For example, Confucian China maintained an
administrative bureaucracy more than two and one-half millen-
nia ago wherein the rights of the individual were secondary to
the individual's duty to be loyal, obedient, and subservient to the
state.2 1 There is every indication that this common view of state
sovereignty continues to exist, thereby fostering continued ac-
ceptance of sovereignty by its people,2 2 and reinforcing China's
conception of external pressure as erosive to sovereignty. The
Hindu conception of sovereign power shares with Confucian
China's a strong sense of individual duty to the state over indi-
vidual rights, with the added notion of tarnishing one's next life
after reincarnation for the nonacceptance of one's present life
and position in it.23 A more youthful manifestation of sovereign
power is demonstrated by the Soviet Union where, earlier this
century, the collective good took precedence over consideration
of individual rights. 2 4 As for many other countries, "[the] ability
to complain [about] ... maladministration by the state's agents
* . . is a process that has not yet arrived in the majority of cul-
tures and political systems, including both modern postindus-
trial states ... and traditional developing societies in Asia and
Africa."2 5 It must be recognized, therefore, that discussion of
sovereign immunity and its relaxation in the context of govern-
ment procurement and the AGP is a concept primarily formu-
lated in Western European countries. 2 6 A common feature of all
21. See LEON HuRwrrz, THE STATE AS DEFENDANT: GOVERNMENTAL Ac-
COUNTABILITY AND THE REDRESS OF INDMDUAL GRIEVANCES 6-7, 28 n.5 (1981).
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 7-8.
24. Id. at 8-9. The Soviet concept of sovereign immunity, although it now
has an independent existence, derives from the czars and the concept of rex
gratia dei. Id. at 9.
25. HuRwrrz, supra note 21, at 3.
26. See Louis W. Goodman, Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention, 9
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 27-28 (1993) (attributing the onset of national
sovereignty to the decline of the Roman Empire and the Treaty of Westphalia).
Of the original signatories to the 1979 AGP, only Japan's culture would be con-
sidered "non-European." Historical trading positions and strong export mar-
kets explain Japan's willingness to join the AGP. Whether Japan abides by
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A GREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
systems appears to be, at least historically, the unimpeachabil-
ity of sovereign actions (including public purchasing).
To members of the European Union (and perhaps to the
AGP members generally by analogy), the distinction between
common law and civil law approaches may be lost because, since
1971, the European Community has undertaken to harmonize
national procurement laws to a common standard. As will be
noted later, there has been significant activity in this area since
the mid- to late- 1980's. It would be a conceit, however, to disre-
gard these distinctions between common and civil law in favor of
the more youthful government procurement regimes that have
inherited either form as the result of conscious adoption or of
colonial imposition. Unlike the European Union, not all coun-
tries share in the close geographic proximities and historic alli-
ances between countries such as England, Germany, and
France. Furthermore, every system will have its own variations
on the civil or common law approach, resulting from historic, re-
gional, and pre- or post- colonial political influences. The varia-
tions are too numerous to include here, not to mention the fact
that many are nowhere described, whether due to the relative
novelty of government procurement as a priority in interna-
tional trade or to the sensitive nature of this issue which would
lead a nation to avoid international scrutiny. It is also impor-
tant to point out how attenuated the process of instituting judi-
cial review has been under either system as well as the nature of
the alterations. Finally, the system adopted by the European
Union can be criticized for failing to recognize arguably valid
policies of Member States outside the realm of purely economic
efficiency.27
a. Common Law Systems 28
In the past, sovereign decisions were beyond review by the
sovereign's own courts. Under the doctrine of rex gratia dei, a
king's power was vested by divine right rather than by a general
grant of ruling power from the general populace. 29 Under this
system, which reached its peak during feudal times, there was
Western-thinking trade agreements such as the AGP is a perennial question of
countries such as the United States.
27. See JOSE M. FERNANDEZ MARTIN, THE EC PUBLIC PROCUREMENT RULES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 89-92 (1996).
28. Common law systems inherited their beginnings from England during
the colonial era. This discussion begins with England and then considers
common law systems generally.
29. See HURWITZ, supra note 21, at 10.
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little popular input in the decision-making processes of govern-
ment.3 0 Rather, the King was bound by God's law and not
man's, which meant that the King could do no wrong and could
not be held accountable by any temporal tribunal, i.e., personal
immunity.3 1 This personal immunity was naturally extended
from the King's person to his household, his agents, and later, to
modern bureaucratic apparatus developing out of the sovereign
power, and thus developed the concept of sovereign immunity.32
The doctrine of rex gratia dei came under attack in England
by scholars such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 33 At
roughly the same time, Charles I was executed, and approxi-
mately forty years later, the Glorious Revolution took place.
The combination of these events eroded the doctrine of rex gratia
dei and altered the related concept of sovereign immunity.34 In
its place arose the concept of rex gratia populi and, after Crom-
well, a strengthened parliamentary system in England. 35 His-
tory has demonstrated, however, that sovereign immunity in the
majority of common law jurisdictions remains a pervasive and
lingering concept in the area of public contracts.
Under the parliamentary system, sovereign powers were
distributed among three institutions: those retained by the King
(executive), those belonging to Parliament (legislative), and
those vested in the judiciary.36 In the modern era, two of these
branches are primarily responsible for government procurement
in common law jurisdictions, i.e., the Crown (or executive
30. Id.
31. Id. One interesting feature of this concept is that the Pope crowned
kings and emperors and therefore legitimized the application of the rex gratia
dei doctrine. A sovereign was, however, bound by God's law if not man's, which
also changed in certain European countries following the Protestant Reforma-
tion, after which the kings themselves could interpret God's law. See id. at 10-
11. There was an avenue of redress, but its use required consent. See PETER W.
HOGG, LIABILITY OF THE CROWN 3-4 (1989) (noting that the King could not be
sued in his own court but was subject to a petition of right during the Middle
Ages); HARRY STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1
(1953) (noting that the petitioner had no right of action absent consent of the
King even under the petition of right).
32. HuRwITZ, supra note 21, at 11.
33. Id. For a brief synopsis of the theories of government responsibility to
the populace of Hobbes, Locke, Austin, Bodin and Salmond in the area of con-
tractual rights, see J.D.B. Mitchell, A General Theory of Public Contracts, 63
JURID. REV. 60, 61-70 (1951).
34. HURWITZ, supra note 21, at 12-13.
35. Id. at 13-14.
36. PAUL LORDON,'CROWN LAW § 1.4, at 7 (1991).
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branch) and the parliament (or legislative branch).3 7 Con-
tracting for the support of ordinary governmental operations is
an executive function for which that office enjoys a general
power to contract under the common law.3 8 The role of the par-
liament (or the legislature) is twofold: 1) to make the appropria-
tions necessary to support executive functions (including
government purchasing),3 9 and 2) to define the exercise of spe-
cial powers not within the purview of executive authority.' 0
Historically, the Crown was generally free to spend as it wished
37. See COLIN TURPIN, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS 137 (2d. ed., 1990) (acknowledging that the concept of
"the state" has been replaced by that of 'the Crown," and is associated with the
idea of executive authority rather than the common interest). Major public
powers are vested in the Crown or servants thereof. Id.
38. Sue Arrowsmith, Government Contracts and Public Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 231, 232-33 (1990).
The United States recognized early on that the Executive has a right to
enter into contracts, even where not previously provided for by law. United
States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 128 (1831). As a general premise, how-
ever, the traditional powers of royal prerogative over domestic commercial mat-
ters in this country have been vested, in whole or in part, in the Congress. See
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 17 (1993). This includes the power over government expenditure, i.e., pro-
curement. Nonetheless, Congress has delegated the majority of purchasing
powers to executive branch agencies and has allowed these agencies to develop
regulations, subject of course to acts of Congress which directly address matters
of government procurement. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 252(a) (1994) (legislative del-
egation of authority over procurement of property and services to executive
agencies with certain exceptions); id. § 404(a) & (b) (creating the Office of Fed-
eral Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget
and conferring power of appointing its Administrator on the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate); id. § 402(a) (noting that economy, efficiency
and effectiveness in the procurement of property and services would be best
served by establishing the OFPP, which in turn develops wide-spread procure-
ment policies, regulations, procedures, and forms). Furthermore, the sizeable
volume of federal regulations contained in the chapters and sub-chapters of 48
Code of Federal Regulations covering procurement are established by executive
departments and agencies. 48 C.F.R at v (1995) (Explanation section).
39. HoGG, supra note 31, at 164 ("[iut is a fundamental constitutional prin-
ciple [in common law jurisdictions] that all expenditures of public funds must
be authorized by statute"); STREET, supra note 31, at 84 (explaining the legisla-
ture's role in England and the United States). See also id. at 90 ("[after legisla-
tive appropriation of funds] it is legally competent to the Executive to expend
that sum at discretion"); Arrowsmith, Government Contracts and Public Law,
supra note 38, at 233 & n.10 (explaining when Parliamentary approval is
required).
40. See SUE ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND JUDICIAL RE-
viEw 120 (1989) (distinguishing between extraordinary powers that would in-
terfere with existing legal rights, and ordinary administrative powers, the
former of which would require parliamentary approval); Arrowsmith, Govern-
ment Contracts and Public Law, supra note 38, at 233.
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under the legal fiction that the Crown was a natural person enti-
tled to the right of freedom of contract 4' once the necessary ap-
propriation was made by Parliament. Administrative tribunals
have often been established to address concerns on both a case-
by-case and a policy basis, but some review authority may re-
main with the judicial branch. Judicial reviewability, however,
is limited to statutes and to regulations to which administrative
bodies are bound to adhere, the latter of which is typically de-
cided as a matter of first instance by review bodies within the
administration. The judicial branch is therefore empowered to
review administrative decisions as the tribunal of first instance
only to the extent that the legislature has created statutes.
Such creations themselves may be sparse because of the conflict
arising under the notion of separation of powers. As will be dis-
cussed later, review over matters of procurement in civil law
systems is more direct.
Despite the application of ordinary contract rules to execu-
tive-driven government procurements, a special body of public
law developed around contracting with the government, which
"take[s into] account.., the special needs and responsibilities of
government."42 Moreover, common law jurisdictions such as
Australia, Canada, and the United States share in this heritage
as just described, albeit with some variations in the manifesta-
tions of sovereignty and sovereign immunity. In short, consider-
ation of "sovereign discretion" inherent in this special body of
law, together with the private nature of government procure-
ment in common law systems, has permitted the subject of gov-
ernment procurement to avoid substantial judicial attention
until relatively recently. 43
41. HoG, supra note 31, at 163-64; ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCURE-
MENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 40, at 113, 132-33 (1988). As one author
explains:
[Tihe Executive enjoys a general power to contract under the common
law. Historically this has arisen from the fact that the Crown, in the
sense of the government was (and possibly still is) in legal theory indis-
tinguishable from the person of the Monarch. Because the Crown is a
natural person, the courts have reasoned, it must possess the same
legal powers as any other natural person, including the power to enter
into contracts ....
Arrowsmith, Government Contracts and Public Law, supra note 38, at 232-33.
42. ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra
note 40, at 2. See also id. at 4-5 (highlighting jurisdictions that have laws deal-
ing specifically with government contracting); HOGo, supra note 31, at 160 (rec-
ognizing the distinct body of law regulating government contracts).
43. See ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW,
supra note 40, at 5.
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While under the notion that procuring entities of the gov-
ernment 44 are free to contract much the same as are private in-
dividuals, a decision to procure, once the proper appropriations
have been made, may nonetheless be governed by rules in the
form of laws, administrative procedures, and regulations. Regu-
lations, as opposed to legislation, are created under executive
authority and attempt to ensure proper supervision and control,
to prevent corruption, to ensure procurement of the right items
at the right prices, and to further political and social objec-
tives.45 Outside of any parameters laid down by statutes, regu-
lations, etc., procurement decisions are not typically subjected to
judicial review. 46 Judicial hesitation to address bidder com-
plaints over contract award procedures is systemic and deeply
rooted in notions of sovereignty; the more loosely procedures for
award are included and defined in legislative or administrative
form, the more discretion procuring entities enjoy which is effec-
tively shielded from judicial review. 47 Moreover, regulations (as
opposed to legislation) are created not by the voting public but
by executive agencies which may be afforded a high degree of
discretion for any perceived special expertise. Determination of
bidders' rights during the bidding process up to the contract
award are limited to specific bidding procedures contained in
statutes and regulations. The operative question becomes
whether a procuring entity, when making an award, has acted
within the parameters of statutory or administrative rules.
44. Although the term "government" could include all three branches men-
tioned above, it is used herein to describe administrative or executive purchas-
ing, or "public" authority. See supra note 37.
45. See HOGG, supra note 31, at 160.
46. See TuRPIN, supra note 37, at 414 ("[tlhere is no appeal against the
decision of a minister or other public authority except in those cases where stat-
ute has provided one .... ."); LORDON, supra note 36, § 2.2, at 120-21 (explaining
that except for British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, which require spe-
cific disclaimer of Crown liability, the presumption of non-applicability of any
statutes has been codified in all Canadian jurisdictions and is only negated by
specific reference).
47. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
204-05 (1970) (noting that the vesting of discretion in procurement officials to
make an award on criteria other than price is the most effective method for
discrimination in procurement). See also, e.g., Regina v. The Lord Chancellor,
Ex parte Hibbit and Saunders (a Firm) and Another, The Times, March 12,
1993, p. 42 (Queen's Bench Divisional Court March 11, 1993) (accepting
amended bids from several but not all bidders on contract for court reporting
services not entitled to judicial review for insufficient public law element, i.e.,
no statutory framework).
1997]
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Only those exercises of authority that are ultra vires are
actionable.4 8
In regard to changing perceptions about government re-
sponsibility in the context of government procurement during
the post-award phase, there is a continuing notion that the gov-
ernment should not be subjected to disputes on an internal level.
Judicial hesitation to hold the government accountable for con-
tractual obligations is also apparent. The theoretical underpin-
nings of this notion were considered more than forty years ago
by one scholar who ultimately found support for the notion that
governmental agencies take on a special character requiring
special treatment for contractual matters.4 9 For this reason,
common law countries have been slow to place government con-
tracts within the reach of their courts.50 As the United States
Supreme Court ruled almost a century ago:
48. TURPIN, supra note 37, at 415-16.
49. Mitchell, supra note 33, at 81. But see Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at
236-41 (advocating abolition of many uses of the sovereign immunity doctrine).
50. Statutory reform placing the English government within the jurisdic-
tion of the courts for suits in contract and tort came about in 1947 with the
Crown Proceedings Act. STREET, supra note 31, at 6. Australia passed legisla-
tion in 1900 and 1903 to permit judicial review of government actions, New
Zealand passed similar legislation in 1950, South Africa passed the Crown Lia-
bilities Act in 1910, and Canada took some preliminary steps in 1927. Id. at 6-
7.
The United States Constitution in art. III, § 2 extends federal judicial juris-
diction to "controversies ... between a State and citizens of another State...."
This was altered by the Eleventh Amendment, however, which removed the
right of a citizen to sue his own state or another state without its consent, and
proscribed suits of a state or citizen against the United States. For a brief dis-
cussion, see HURWITZ, supra note 21, at 20-21. However, the Tucker Act of 1887
authorized suits against the government, though judicial proceedings were lim-
ited to the Federal Court of Claims rather than to all courts generally. See
generally STREET, supra note 31, at 81. Claims Court jurisdiction over contract
claims against the United States "founded either upon.., any Act of Congress
or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract . . . ." is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). It should also be
mentioned, however, that government contract disputes are subject to an ad-
ministrative framework in the post-award phase. See 41 U.S.C. § 601-07
(1994). A claim first goes to the contracting officer for decision, id. § 605(a),
unless it involves the Tennessee Valley Authority, id. § 602(b), or if it involves a
foreign government or agency, international organization or subsidiary thereof,
and if the head of the agency involved determines that application of the Con-
tract Disputes Act would not be in the public interest. Id. § 602(c) (emphasis
added). Appeal may be taken to an agency's board of contract appeals, id.
§ 606, with final appeal possible before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Id. § 607. The policy of preventing alternative dispute res-
olution in this area may be in the process of change, however. See Paul J. Car-
rier, New Policy Regarding Arbitration of Government Procurement Disputes in
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It is elemental, of course, that the state or sovereign cannot be sued in
its own courts without its consent; and this is as applicable to a depen-
dent state or sovereignty as to one which has no suzerain or overlord.
The political entity which makes laws and creates tribunals for their
enforcement, which creates judicial remedies and legislates as to how,
when, and under what conditions rights may be litigated and remedies
enforced, manifestly cannot be sued in the courts of its creation except
by its own consent and legislative provision. In the other case, such
political entity would be subordinate to its own creatures. 5
1
The sovereign acts doctrine developed in the United States
illustrates the precarious balance between sovereign immunity
on one side, and obligations undertaken via contract in the post-
award phase on the other.52 The doctrine applies to cases where
a sovereign act prevents fulfillment of the government's respon-
sibility under a pre-existing contract. On one hand are notions
of responsibility for obligations created by the free exercise of
the government's right to contract. On the other are notions of
its responsibility to the public as the sovereign unrelated to the
contract in dispute. While obligations arise under the former,
notions of sovereign immunity advocate a finding of no liability
in accord with the latter concern. This led to the notion of the
dual capacity of the government to act as the sovereign as well
as a private participant in commerce. 53 Especially in cases
where the sovereign as market participant is unaware of legisla-
tion that could affect its obligations under a pre-existing con-
tract, the successful contractor bears the risk of future
legislation which impedes or terminates the contract.
The number of laws and regulations affecting how govern-
ment purchasing is to be conducted in common law systems has
increased significantly during the last few decades. While it is
clear that new laws and special administrative guidelines and
procedures (i.e., public law) have been developed, lingering no-
tions of sovereign immunity and the private right of freedom to
contract remain, blurring the distinction between public and pri-
the United States, 5 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. CS 74 (1996) (current survey
article).
51. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 351 (1907).
52. For a highly comprehensive discussion of the sovereign acts doctrine,
see Ronald G. Morgan, Identifying Protected Government Acts under the Sover-
eign Acts Doctrine: A Question of Acts and Actors, 22 PUB. CoNTRACT L.J. 223
(1993). The doctrine was first announced by the U.S. Court of Claims in 1865.
See id. (citing Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865) and Jones v. United
States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865)).
England, Canada, and Australia have a similar convention preventing the
fettering of statutory powers. See Hoco, supra note 31, at 170 & n.55.
53. Morgan, supra note 52, at 226-27.
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vate contractual rights and responsibilities. Ad hoc legislation
and regulations, characteristic of common law systems, compli-
cate matters and make comprehension of procurement regimes
on the part of foreign bidders difficult, as do difficulties of either
internal revision or revisions made in response to multilateral
accords.54
b. Civil Law Systems 55
Prior to the late eighteenth century, government con-
tracting in civil law jurisdictions was conducted in much the
same fashion as in common law systems. 56 The modern conti-
nental (civil) law system of government procurement arises from
ancient Roman law and the ideas behind the French Revolu-
54. As an example, a 1972 study identified more than four thousand fed-
eral laws related to United States government procurement. 1 REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 10 (1972). One of the dangers of
such a high degree of regulation, albeit intended to prevent graft, is that "there
might result so much 'red tape' that higher bids and less competition would be
an injury to the public as grave as fraud." STREET, supra note 31, at 97 (citing
H.G. JAMES, THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC INTERESTS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS
(1946)). Moreover, there are more than 80,000 government bodies empowered
to spend public funds. DAVID N. BURT & RICHARD L. PINKERTON, A PURCHASING
MANAGER'S GUIDE TO STRATEGIC PROACTrvE PROCUREMENT 16 (1996). While all
of these bodies are required to adhere to the major statutory procedures and
regulations, the various individual bodies will certainly develop an immense
number of administrative policies and practices that complicate the bidding
process. As another example, England did not pass any comprehensive na-
tional procurement legislation or code until its adaptation to the EC Directives
on Procurement. INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER UNCTAD/GATT, IMPROVING
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS: GUIDE No. 23, at 21 & n.19 (1993) (technical
paper).
55. Like France, Continental European countries such as Belgium,
Holland, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and
Turkey have created separate systems of administration that include a system
of review. ZAIM M. NEDJATI, J.E. TRICE & A.A. DASHWOOD, ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL SYSTEMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35 (1978). Continental systems
have their origins in the French system established around the time of the
French Revolution. Id. at 36. Discussion in this section focuses on the French
archetype, with reference to differences in other continental systems where
appropriate. For a brief discussion of some of these systems as they were
formed and as they exist in the modern era, see id. at 36-44 (France), 45-51
(West Germany), 51-52 (Belgium), 52-53 (Italy), 53-54 (Greece), 54-55 (Turkey);
L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 252-53
(generally), 253-54 (Belgium), 254-56 (the Netherlands), 257-58 (Italy), 258-60
(Germany), 261-62 (Greece) (1993).
56. Medieval France is said to have epitomized the rex gratia dei principle
and the concept of sovereign immunity. HURWITZ, supra note 21, at 23. An
exception was the Holy Roman Empire, which established an administrative
code long before other continental systems developed their own codes.
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tion.57 Beginning with France, civil law countries have di-
vorced government contracts from notions of private law in favor
of creating an administrative system.58 A distinctive feature of
the French system is the development of two institutions: a sep-
arate body of law governing competence of administrative au-
thorities and their relationship with each other and private
individuals (droit administratif, and particularly, the concept of
contrats administratif), and a separate system of administrative
courts having jurisdiction over disputes in this field to the pri-
mary exclusion of judicial courts. 59
Under what is known as the Ancien Regime, there existed a
system of courts (Parlements) charged with handling adminis-
trative disputes.60 Around the time of the French Revolution,
these Parlements became unpopular for their costliness and lack
of speedy resolution. 61 These factors, coupled with the King's
power to remove disputes from these courts in favor of decision
by his council, and disputes over authority between the King's
representatives and the Parlements led to their ultimate de-
mise.62 France too had a champion of the separation of powers
in Montesquieu and his Esprit des Lois.63 In 1790, a law was
passed preventing judicial courts from interfering in administra-
tive matters under penalty of forfeiting their offices. 64 Authority
over administrative disputes was vested in the administrators
themselves the very same year.65
57. GOSTA WESTRING, INTERNATIONAL PROCUREMENT: A TRAINING MANUAL
39 (rev. 1990). Countries such as Francophone Africa inherited the French sys-
tem during the colonial era, while much of Europe modelled national systems
after that of the French. Id.
58. William Rohkam, Jr., The Annulment of Administrative Acts for Excess
of Power, with Special Reference to the Doctrine of Detournement de Pouvoir, in
WILLIAM ROHKAM, JR. & ORVILLE C. PRATT IV, STUDIES IN FRENCH ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 11, 13 (1947).
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id. at 13. See also NEDJATI, TRICE & DASHWOOD, supra note 55, at 36.
61. Rohkam, supra note 58, at 13.
62. Id. at 13-14.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id.; see also NEDJATI, TRICE & DASHWOOD, supra note 55, at 36 (describ-
ing conditions that led to the establishment of statutes mandating separation of
judicial and administrative matters). The separation of powers and functions is
also attributable in part to Napoleon, then First Consul, who favored restric-
tions on legislative and judicial jurisdiction in favor of a strongly centralized
autocracy over which control of administrators was retained by the executive
branch. See BROWN & BELL, supra note 55, at 23.
65. Rohkam, supra note 58, at 14. As discussed earlier, courts in common
law systems are hesitant to decide matters which would conflict with adminis-
trative authority and tend to do so only by clear legislative or regulatory direc-
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In 1800, the Conseil d'Etat was created by constitutional
provision to settle difficulties arising in administrative matters,
which now includes government purchasing. 66 Civil courts were
also established to supervise the legal relationship between indi-
viduals, and now include review of contract disputes between
private citizens and the State where their nature is essentially
private rather than administrative.6 7 In 1937, the National
Tender Board was established as an administrative tribunal en-
abled to review and approve government procurement contracts,
although its role has changed to a more advisory one over
time.68 Not only were the supervising authorities over ordinary
civil and administrative matters separate and distinct,69 but
separate governing bodies of law also developed.70 Although
French government procurements must adhere to several major
requirements of ordinary contract law (civil), most of the proce-
dures, practices, and rules are found in the Code des marches
publiques and in administrative circulars. 71
While both common law and continental procurement sys-
tems treat public purchasing as an administrative or quasi-ad-
ministrative function, continental systems, and especially that
of France, are typically more comprehensive than those of their
common law counterparts for their codifications and separate
tive. Placing review authority over executive (administrative) decisions with
that branch itself avoids problems surrounding separation-of-powers concerns.
66. Id. at 15. The Conseils de Prefecture (now called Tribunaux adminis-
tratif), which resolve disputes between citizens and contractors not arising from
"administrative" acts, were established during the same year. Marie-Aimee de
Latournerie, The Law of France, in GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 200 & n.3 (J. Bell & A.W. Bradley eds., 1991); see also BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 42
(1954). Twenty years later, the Conseils de Prefecture were permitted by the
Conseil d'Etat to adjudicate claims against the Administration, Latournerie,
supra at 201, which are now the courts of first instance for review of public
purchasing disputes. For a general discussion of the maturation of the Conseil
d'Etat, see BROWN & BELL, supra note 55, at 43-46; Rohkam, supra note 58, at
16-20.
67. See NEDJATI, TRICE & DASHWOOD, supra note 55, at 76-77.
68. INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER UNCTAD/GATT, GUIDE No. 23, supra
note 54, at 37. Many of the African countries adopting a form of the French
system have established central, regional, and local tender boards to oversee
government purchases.
69. See ANDRE DE LAUBADERE, JEAN-CLAUDE VENEZIA & YVES GUADEMET,
MANUEL DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 16 (1992) (noting that the union of droit ad-
ministratif and jurisdiction administrative constitutes a "regime administra-
tif'); cf. supra note 65.
70. See Claude Goldman, An Introduction to the French Law of Government
Procurement, 20 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 461, 461-62 (1987).
71. Goldman, supra note 70, at 461-62.
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tribunals. Ironically, much of the guidance found in the French
system comes from case decisions interpreting codes and admin-
istrative regulations, 72 which is akin to the operation of case
precedent in common law systems. Furthermore, the French
system regards administrative contracts as essentially an ar-
rangement between unequal parties, 73 which leads to a more re-
fined concept of government responsibility and legality of action
more protective of private interests than its common law
counterparts. 74
As was true of common law systems, however, the tradi-
tional rule was that acts of the French Government were exempt
from recourse for excess of power,75 which includes public
purchasing decisions. Today, parties attempting to contract
with the government may seek annulment of a contract award
(recours de annulation) if made outside the scope of administra-
tive authority.76 In the post-award phase, parties having con-
tracted with the government may be entitled to compensation
for extra costs arising from unforeseen, supervening circum-
stances (imprevision), and more certainly for costs added by
modification of contract terms by an administrative body (super-
vision).77 Similar to common law systems, however, a party
having contracted with the government is not necessarily enti-
72. See Brown & Bell, supra note 55, at 2-3 (noting this phenomenon for
administrative law generally); cf NEDJATI, TRICE & DAsHWOOD, supra note 55,
at 35 (noting that jurisdiction of the administrative courts and tribunals was
developed primarily by case law at first).
73. BROWN & BELL, supra note 55, at 192 & n.26. This contrasts with the
common law notion that the sovereign is free to contract like an ordinary indi-
vidual, which connotes placing the government on an equal contractual footing.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
74. BROWN & BELL, supra note 55, at 202. For a general discussion of the
rise in administrative responsibility in both France and Italy, see Jacques van
Compernolle & G. Closset-Marchal, La Responsibilite du Fait des Acts du Ser-
vice Public de la Justice: Elements de Droit Compare et Perspectives de <<Lege
Ferenda>>, in LA RESPONSIBILITE DE POUVORS PUBLICS, Titre III, Ch. III, 413,
413-26 (France) and 427-31 (Italy) (Actes du Colloque Interuniversitaire Organ-
ise les 14 et 15 Mars 1991 par la Faculte de Droit de ' Universite Catholique de
Louvain et la Faculte de Droit de l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1991).
75. Rohkam, supra note 58, at 22 & n.9. For a general discussion of the
"excess of power" doctrine in France, see id. at 32-56.
76. NEDJATI, TRICE & DASHWOOD, supra note 55, at 76-77. The petition is
called recours pour exces de pouvoir (recourse for actions exceeding an adminis-
trative body's authorized powers). SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 200. This is a
manifestation of the ultra vires doctrine, id., and may be filed for, among other
reasons, a failure to observe procedures required by law or for an abuse of
power. Id. at 203.
77. NEDJATI, TRICE & DASHWOOD, supra note 55, at 170.
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tled to indemnity where the administration passes legislation
affecting all citizens generally (fait du prince).78
Although the French system, and to varying degrees, sys-
tems based on the French civil law tradition, suspend notions of
sovereignty to a greater extent than is true with common law
systems, this does not necessarily apply to bidders of other coun-
tries on government procurement contracts.7 9 The high degree
of discretion afforded to procuring agents in civil law systems (as
provided in administrative regulations) is perhaps the most ef-
fective and least challengeable method of protecting domestic
bidders in government procurement.80 This fact is undoubtedly
the reason behind a controversy between the United States and
Germany over implementation of the European Union's Public
Utilities Directive8 l and with the European Union as well,8 2
which treats bids within a three percent margin of the lowest-
cost bid as "equivalent." 3 The three percent provision is sus-
pended in cases where the EU has entered into an international
agreement via the same subsection and therefore would presum-
ably not conflict with AGP obligations.
2. External Sovereignty and Inducement
While internal sovereignty concerns the relationship of a
governmental purchasing entity to its nationals, external sover-
eignty concerns the relationship between the contracting sover-
eign to the nationals (including corporations and enterprises) of
other countries. In such cases, there is an extra consideration
related to sovereignty, i.e., how any acts or decisions possibly
involving external suppliers of goods, supplies and services af-
78. Id.; cf supra note 52 and accompanying text (common law act of state
doctrine).
79. See, e.g., Friedl Weiss, Public Procurement Law in the EC Internal
Market 1992: The Second Coming of the European Champion, 37 THE ANTi-
TRUST BULL. 307, 312 (1992) (describing the continental European practice of
favoring "national champions" in contract awards).
80. See, e.g., DAM, supra note 47, at 204 (characterizing discretionary au-
thority as the "most effective method for discriminating against foreign suppli-
ers" in government procurement). Denial of reviewability under the common
law system would be for lack of a sufficient public element, i.e., a law or binding
regulation. See Regina v. The Lord Chancellor, supra note 47. A finding of un-
reviewability in a civil law system would likely be based on deference paid to
the administrative tribunal for its special expertise.
81. U.S. Lifts Sanctions Against Germany Imposed Over EU Procurement
Directive, 11 Intl Trade Rptr. (BNA) 434 (Mar. 16, 1994).
82. U.S., EU Try to Resolve Their Dispute Over Procurement, Agree to More
Talks, 11 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) 564 (Apr. 13, 1994).
83. 1993 O.J. (L 199) 84, art. 36(3).
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fect the interests of the country and its nationals. It is no secret
that procurement policy takes into consideration national em-
ployment levels,8 4 money flows related to balance-of-payments
concerns,8 5 industrial development policy,86 national security,8 7
and even the return of expenditures to the government by way of
national taxation schemes. 8 Pressure from external sources to
liberalize procurement policies is all the more poignant for the
fact that it sometimes appears to run counter to the sovereign's
(i.e., executive and legislative branches) avowed purpose of ful-
filling its trust to its constituency.
Historically, sovereign power, when exercised entirely
within the nation's own boundaries, is inviolable against any ex-
ternal challenge not undertaken within the country being chal-
lenged.8 9 The sovereign immunity doctrine is one of judicial
restraint and dictates that a sovereign cannot be brought before
the courts of another nation for acts committed entirely within
its boundaries unless the sovereign consents to that exercise of
jurisdiction.90 While inroads have been made for adoption of a
84. DAM, supra note 47, at 200 (protection of local industry). The rise in
use of this justification for protectionist procurement policy may be attributed
in significant degree to the theory of unemployment developed by John May-
nard Keynes in the 1930's, which held that immovable unemployment levels
could be stimulated by changes in government expenditure where the economy
was not producing at full capacity. See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
85. Id.
86. Id. While industrial policy would affect employment levels generally, it
could also be used to change the nature of an economy from, for example, agra-
rian to industrial.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 8607 (1965) (statement of Rep. Saylor) ("[It]
has recently been estimated that at least 30 percent of every dollar spent from
the sale of the product involved [in a government purchase] eventually goes -
through corporate, personal, property, and sales taxes - to Federal, State, and
local taxing bodies.") Of course, sales to a government by external concerns
would also be subjected to taxation, but the level of taxation of monies in the
hands of non-nationals outside the taxing country is arguably more limited, es-
pecially where there exists a liberal scheme for repatriation of profits by foreign
recipients.
89. This is known as the "territoriality" principle, which is closely con-
nected to the concept of sovereign immunity. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 11 (1991); see also Lauterpacht, supra note 15,
at 231-32 (attributing the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine in
favor of foreign states to its historical, internal applications rather than solely
to concepts of comity and the dignity of foreign states).
90. See supra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text. See also CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 89, at 549-50; Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are
We Being Propelled Towards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 & n. 1 (1993). For a general discussion of the ap-
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restrictive rather than an absolute prohibition against the exer-
cise of jurisdiction, 9 ' there remains considerable objection to the
proach of various countries including Spain, Great Britain, Belgium and the
United States to sovereign immunity prior to this century, see Sweeney, The
International Law of Sovereign Immunity, in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 89,
at 550-53. The seminal case describing the U.S. position of absolute immunity,
which prevailed until 1952, is The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812). As was noted in the context of internal notions of sovereignty in the
previous section, there is a long history of judicial hesitation against overstep-
ping the boundaries of sovereign power. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text. The same hesitation applies to judicial exercise ofjurisdiction over foreign
sovereign acts, with obvious complications due to the fact that a foreign sover-
eign is involved. In both cases, legislative (or administrative) pronouncement
on waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to jurisdiction where absolute
immunity is recognized.
91. Under the concept of absolute immunity, the jurisdiction question cen-
ters upon the nature of the organization or enterprise in relation to the sover-
eign. The policy of restrictive immunity, which appeared prior to World War II
and has gained increasing acceptance ever since, focuses upon the nature of the
activity in question rather than on the nature of the organization or enter-
prises. See Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 222-26. Perhaps the most illustra-
tive example, which also has serious implications in the public purchasing
context, is the manner in which European national courts treat state trading
enterprises that are authorized to make purchases on behalf of the government.
In certain cases, these enterprises act more as market participants than gov-
ernment-authorized agents, and modern thinking is therefore beginning to
change in favor of denying recognition of the sovereign immunity doctrine. See
generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS, 110-18 (1988). For a discussion of modern approaches of courts in Ger-
many, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy, see id. at 105-10.
Canada adopted the restrictive theory in 1982. See The State Immunity Act,
R.S.C., c.S-18 (1985) (as amended); H.L. Molot & M.L. Jewett, The State Immu-
nity Act of Canada, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 79 (1982).
The United States has also taken steps to establish jurisdiction of its courts
over disputes involving another nation under certain circumstances in the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-07 (1989 and
May, 1996 Supp.). For example, § 1605(a)(2) provides for U.S. court jurisdiction
over controversies between private individuals and another government for
"commercial activity carried on in the United States," "act[s] performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where," and "upon an act outside the territory of the United States . .. [that]
causes a direct effect in the United States." Section 1604, however, recognizes
the existence of sovereign immunity except for actions listed in §§ 1605-1607.
Similarly, U.S. courts recognize the act of state doctrine even where jurisdiction
is otherwise established, which is distinguished from sovereign immunity in
that it assesses whether the application of any law other than that of a sover-
eign before the court would be too intrusive such that recourse to diplomatic
channels is more appropriate. See PAUL B. STEPHAN, III, DON WALLACE, JR. &
JULIE A. ROIN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLICY 125,
142 (1993); International Assoc. of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC), 649 F.2d 1354, 1357-61 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied
454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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trend toward relaxation of the prohibition. 92 Moreover, interna-
tional liberalization efforts for matters such as public purchas-
ing must begin from within each country in the form of waiver
by international agreement or by legislative or administrative
enactment. 93 A necessary element for success in achieving a
waiver of sovereign immunity is some form of inducement.
The issue is primarily an economic one. Countries with
strong manufacturing and professional services bases, and
therefore in a position to take advantage of export markets, are
at the forefront of the movement to liberalize the international
government procurement market.94 Unrestricted access to pro-
curement markets in countries whose industries could not (or
cannot yet) produce goods and services of equivalent price or
quality would be facing net cash flows moving out of the country,
i.e., trade imbalances and balance-of-payments problems. Fur-
thermore, the ability to direct government procurement funds to
poorer areas, to industries targeted for vital development, or
even to patrons of the political regime in power for past and fu-
ture support is hindered by an open, international public
purchasing system. 95 Maintenance of a closed government pro-
92. In response to this trend, Third-World and socialist commentators have
sometimes protested against accepting developed-country liberalization of their
approaches to sovereign immunity as general state practice (that could become
the basis of customary international law) in favor of retaining the notion of ab-
solute immunity. SCHREUER, supra note 91, at 4 & n.14. At that time when an
international norm develops, it could become customary international law,
which is binding on all nations. At present, there is insufficient international
consensus on any principles related to international government procurement
that could take on the status of customary international law. Liberalization
must therefore be instigated by international accord, which is addressed briefly
in the section that follows. Cf Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 90, at 1 ("Each
sovereign state can only be legally bound by those commitments it willingly
makes to other sovereign states, and by those few principles which are viewed
as binding on all states.").
93. Lauterpacht, supra note 15, at 237.
94. The majority of original participants in the Government Procurement
Agreement of 1980 had highly-developed manufacturing and/or professional
services industries that could only benefit from further market liberalization.
These were Austria, Canada, the European Economic Community collectively,
Finland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Hong Kong (by the
United Kingdom), and the United States. See Committee on Government Pro-
curement, Report (1982) of the Chairman, presented to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES at their thirty-eighth session, 1981-1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.)
at 39 (1983).
95. A helpful distinction is that between the primary objective of procure-
ment (best possible value for the money) and secondary objectives (social and
political motivations). See ARROWSMITH, GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND JUDI-
cL REVIEW, supra note 40, at 60-81, 81-106 (making this distinction and using
Canadian law and practice as the example).
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curement market is therefore understandable, and there exists a
variety of mechanisms protecting domestic bidders which are
demonstrated in all countries to greater and lesser degrees.96
At the turn of the century, the United States did not have a leg-
islative scheme in favor of protecting domestic industry in public
procurement, but one was created in the 1930's in response to
perceived protectionism on the part of other countries. 97 On the
other hand, the U.S. export base in light of its industrial and
manufacturing strength, as well as the economic turmoil of
World Wars I- & II-era Europe, 98 illustrates the underlying
motivations.
The question then becomes how to convince countries to
adopt liberal public purchasing laws which provide opportunity
to bidders of other countries. Entreaties from more highly de-
veloped economies that have 'had their day in the sun' are, at
least at present, not enough. Guarantees of at least equivalent
public contract values could ease fears of falling too far behind in
the balance of trade, but the AGP calls for roughly equivalent
access of bidding opportunity, not for equivalent contract awards
or values. The only inducement that appears to work in this
context is to require countries to adhere to the AGP as the price
for acceptance into other WTO agreements such as GATT, 99
which was the case for South Korea. 00 A related mechanism is
at work in regard to certain central and eastern European coun-
tries, which have been advised that ultimate admission into the
European Union, or at least a more substantial regional ar-
96. Perhaps the most effective method for discrimination in government
procurement is the vesting of substantial purchasing discretion in administra-
tors. See supra note 46. Other methods include offset requirements, technical
specifications, and licensing requirements, just to name a few.
97. Martin J. Golub & Sandra Lee Fenske, U.S. Government Procurement:
Opportunities and Obstacles For Foreign Contractors, 20 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 567, 573-74 (1987). This is not necessarily to say that actual practice
was completely neutral as to the origin of items and services being procured.
98. See generally CLAIR WILcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 4-10 (1949).
Of particular note is the fact that the United States shipped roughly a third of
the world's exports while consuming only a tenth of world imports at the conclu-
sion of World War II. Id. at 10.
99. Wallace, supra note 10. See also, e.g., BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
No. 1883, EXPORT SHIPPING MANUAL 114:21 (June 12, 1991) (U.S. encourage-
ment of Morocco to accede to the 1980 version of the Agreement on Government
Procurement as part of its accession to the world trade body).
100. South Korea, though not a party to the 1981 Agreement, has signed the
new AGP. Sue Arrowsmith, Third Country Access to E. C. Public Procurement, 4
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 1, 27 (1995). The effective date of AGP for South
Korea is January, 1997, one year after the effective date for the other
signatories.
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rangement with the EU, hinges upon approximation of their
laws to those of the EU, including those on public purchasing. 1 1
A more effective mechanism is the use of conditions on the
grant of World Bank-related loans and grants which require ad-
herence to sound procurement practices for the projects being
financed in whole or in part with World Bank funds. This famil-
iarizes procuring entities with sound (and country-neutral) poli-
cies, and it may also require amendments to the national
procurement regime of a borrowing nation in order to ensure the
proper functioning of the project at hand. 10 2 As inducement for
participation, i.e., the surrender of sovereign authority, the bor-
rowing nation receives monies necessary for infrastructure
projects and significant aid to make them work.'0 3 Use of the
World Bank's standard bidding documents for funded projects
serves the same basic purposes. The United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law has recently published a model
101. See WHITE PAPER: PREPARATION OF THE ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES OF CEN-
TRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE FOR INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNAL MARKET OF
THE UNION, COM(95) 163 final (March 5, 1995). The proposals set forth therein
are intended for use by the "associated countries," being the Central European
Free Trade Area countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the
Slovak Republic), Bulgaria, and Romania. The EU's policy on procurement is
found in the Annex and is not very detailed, but the overall policy is clearly
stated in the body of the White Paper:
[Elxplain[ I] the purpose and development of legislation in each sector,
describing the structures that are necessary to ensure its implementa-
tion and enforcement and suggesting the sequence in which legislation
in each sector might be tackled. The Commission believes that the em-
phasis on how to ensure that the legislation is made effective is an
important message for the associated countries and one which will be
helpful to them and ultimately to an enlarged Union in achieving real
rather than simply formal alignment.
Id. § 1.16, at 7.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have adopted comprehensive
new procurement laws in recent years. See, e.g., The Act of June 10th, 1994, on
Public Procurement, as amended July 6, 1995 and Ordinance of the Council of
Ministers of December 18, 1994, on Applying Domestic Preferences in Con-
ducting Public Procurements, reprinted in Polish Journal of Law Dz. U. No.
140, Item 776 (Poland).
102. See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 90, at 18-19.
103. An interesting comparison arises between the failed ITO Charter and
the Bretton Woods Institutions, which include the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Aspects of the former were related to creating
a non-discriminatory, competitive international trading environment. Induce-
ment for participation was the chance at outperforming other members in ex-
port markets, at least in certain sectors, in order to maintain or improve a
member's trading position. In contrast, IMF grants and World Bank loans en-
sure funds for important infrastructure development, albeit with certain
conditions.
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law for the procurement of goods, services, and construction 0 4
which provides a helpful backdrop for countries undergoing pro-
curement reform, but it too lacks a particularized inducement
mechanism.
Based on the foregoing, it is asserted that the AGP as pres-
ently formulated may not bring with it sufficient rewards or as-
surances for developing and least-developed countries in order
to encourage liberalization in national procurement regimes.
Before turning to a discussion of sovereignty in the context of
the AGP, however, it is necessary to briefly explain how a waiver
of sovereign immunity may be accomplished.
B. WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
Because there are no concrete international norms concern-
ing government procurement, sovereigns engaging in public
purchasing are only bound to follow open, internationally-ori-
ented procurement practices if they have waived sovereign im-
munity by international agreement or some form of
legislation.105 In certain cases, nations conducting a truly com-
mercial (rather than a sovereign) function either within, or with
direct effects in, another jurisdiction may be found to have
waived sovereign immunity if the other jurisdiction follows the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.' 0 6 On the other hand,
most procurements are conducted within the territory of the
purchasing government. As a general rule, countries apply their
national laws of contract and of procurement to contracts exe-
cuted in their own territories. Access of foreign bidders to gov-
ernment contracts, as well as protection of successful foreign
bidders in the post-award phase, is therefore determined by na-
tional laws in the absence of an international accord. Because
public opinion is generally in favor of protecting domestic indus-
104. Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 17, Annex 1, at 58-96, U.N. Doc. A/49/17, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 718, 721-57(1995). The UN General Assembly indicated approval of the Model Law and its
accompanying guide via Resolution 49/59 of December 9, 1994. Reference is
made to the 1994 version which, although similar to a version of 1993, now
includes services. The 1993 version and an introductory note are reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 445 (1994).
105. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
106. While a significant number of countries have adopted restrictive immu-
nity theory, others have protested that this is not customary international prac-
tice. See supra notes 91-92.
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try, 107 it is unlikely that a legislature or parliament would of its
own accord adopt laws calling for equal treatment of foreign bid-
ders, especially in connection with the bidding stages. What is
left are international agreements*108
The best example is the AGP, which requires a defined set
of government agencies and departments in each signatory to
afford national treatment to bidders of other signatory coun-
tries. There are exceptions to this requirement, however, which
are addressed below. Most important is the limitation of the
AGP's provisions to entities listed in its Annexes, which leaves
the majority of public purchasing outside of the AGP
framework.10 9
Another example is the set of EU Procurement Directives.
These directives are also limited: they only bind the members of
the EU, a GATT Article XXIV regional arrangement. 110 There
are now four primary Directives covering procurement of works,
services, supplies, and utilities,111 together with two Remedies
Directives,11 2 which require EU Members to "bring into force...
107. See Weiss, supra note 79, at 16-17 ("Public opinion, furthermore, is un-
ffinchingly attached to the popular belief that public expenditure must be used
to procure domestic goods and secure domestic employment. .. ").
108. Relations with foreign bidders and their governments over access to
national procurement markets could be viewed as an issue primarily affecting
external relations, which would classify it as matter within the realm of execu-
tive rather than the legislative authority. For a brief discussion of the expan-
sion of executive authority in the United States at the expense of legislative
authority where the distinction between domestic and international issues is
blurred, see Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 90, at 7.
109. There are, however, several provisions calling for future liberalization
and negotiation. See, e.g., AGP, supra note 8, art. XXIV, 7.
110. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XXIV (customs unions and free trade
areas provisions).
111. Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 Concerning the Coordina-
tion of Procedures for the Award of Public Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 199) 54;
Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 Relating to the Coordination of
Procedures for the Award of Public Service Contracts, 1992 O.J. (L209) 1; Coun-
cil Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 Coordinating Procedures for the Award
of Public Supply Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 199) 1; Council Directive 93/38/EEC of
14 June 1993 Coordinating the Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating
in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors, 1993 O.J. (L
199) 84. For a general discussion of these Directives, see CHRIsToPHER BRIGHT,
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT HANDBOOK 7-82 (1994) (providing an overview of these
Directives as well as a sector-by-sector analysis).
112. Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the Coordina-
tion of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions Relating to the
Application of Review Procedures to the Award of Public Supply and Public
Works Contracts, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 33; Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 Feb-
ruary 1992 Coordinating the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions
Relating to the Application of Community Rules on the Procurement Proce-
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the measures necessary to comply with this Directive ... [and]
communicate to the Commission the texts of the main national
laws, regulations and administrative provisions ... ." in regard
to earlier versions of the Works and Supplies Directives. 113 The
four substantive Directives leave little room for national favorit-
ism above threshold limits contained therein. Moreover, private
citizens may pursue actions for breach of these rules under the
"direct effects" doctrine if an EU Member fails to implement
properly the basic requirements of the Directives such that bid-
ders from other Member countries are not protected by national
law.114 In fact, much of the movement toward liberalization in
government procurement occurs in Art. XXJV arrangements.
For example, Chapter 10 of the NAFTA contains a trilateral pro-
curement regime. 115 Even the Central European Free Trade
Agreement has a short chapter on procurement, which requires
progressive development of regulations by January 1, 2001, in
accord with the provisions of the older version of the AGP as
amended in 1987.116
dures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommuni-
cations Sectors, 1992 O.J. (L 76) 14. See generally PETER-ARMIN TREPTE,
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN THE EC 701, at 188-200 (1993) (describing the Reme-
dies Directives).
113. Council Directive 89/665/EEC, art. 5, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 33, 35.
114. See generally TREPTE, supra note 112, 702, at 190. An EC obligation,
such as a directive or regulation, has 'direct effect" if" the obligation imposed
on member states is clear and precise, unconditional and, in the event of imple-
menting measures, the member states or Community institutions are not given
any margin of discretion." Id. I 702(b), at 191. See also MARK BREALEY &
CONOR QUIGLEY, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NrrY: 1992 HANDBOOK 107-108 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the means by which one
who believes that an EU Member State or public authority has breached its
obligations under the Community rules on public procurement may bring a
claim). For a discussion ofnon-EU bidder access to EU procurements generally,
see Sue Arrowsmith, Third Country Access to E.C. Public Procurement: An
Analysis of the Legal Framework, 4 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 1 (1995).
115. North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 8,
1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 613-22 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
116. Central European Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 21, 1992, arts. 1 & 24:2,
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 8, 9, 13 (1995). Cf infra note 148 and accompanying text
(describing AGP sanction of regional arrangements to encourage economic de-
velopment of developing and least-developed countries).
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II. SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE AGP
A. STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK
Unlike GATT 1947 and GATT 1994,117 the focus of partici-
pation under the AGP is on the number of procuring agencies
and departments contained in each country's schedule of cov-
ered entities in Appendix I.118 Covered entities are required to
provide national treatment and to follow non-discrimination
principles towards bidders of foreign signatory countries. 119
By contrast, participation in GATT is defined not in terms of
procuring entities, but in terms of trade in goods. Specific GATT
obligations arise for all goods contained in each party's Sched-
ules of Commitments, 120 while general GATT obligations apply
to all trade in goods. 121 Although it is more complex, GATS
utilizes a unique hybrid of commitments derived from the
GATT. The first pillar of GATS provides for general obligations
of signatories such as Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment
and transparency for all services generally (with the standard
litany of exceptions such as national security or balance-of-pay-
ments imbalances reasons). 122 The second provides for a list of
negotiated exemptions from MFN coverage necessitated by the
belief of many countries that conformity with GATS by its effec-
tive date would have been impossible. 123 The third aspect of
GATS, more like the GATT Schedules of Commitments, posi-
tively lists all commitments undertaken ab initio for purposes of
national treatment and market access.124 Comparison of obliga-
117. The starting point for this agreement is GATT 1947. See GATT, supra
note 12. Annex 1A of the Final Act contains GATT 1994. See FINAL RESULTS,
supra note 1, at 20. Section 1(a) of GATT 1994 incorporates GATT 1947, while
sections 1(b) and 1(c) incorporate changes made to the 1947 version and the
new understandings on GATT articles, respectively. GATT 1994 and the Un-
derstandings referred to in section 1(c) are reproduced in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1154
(1994). For ease of reference, citation to articles unaffected by recent changes
will not designate the year.
118. AGP, supra note 8, art. I, 1. Each schedule is divided into five An-
nexes categorized as follows: 1) central governments; 2) sub-central govern-
ments; 3) all other entities the signatories choose to list; 4) services to be
covered (or not covered) by the agreement; and 5) covered construction services.
Id. art. I, n.1.
119. Id. art. III.
120. GATT, supra note 12, art. II.
121. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 13, § 10.1, at 204.
122. Paul Carrier, An Assessment of Regional Economic Integration Agree-
ments After the Uruguay Round, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 30 (1996).
123. Id. at 34.
124. Id. at 35-36.
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tions found in GATT or GATS to those in the AGP makes clear
that the AGP's parameters on trade liberalization are narrower.
The reason behind organizing the AGP around procuring
entities rather than the nature of the items procured is not en-
tirely clear. One possibility is that it may be more difficult to
define and to list the types of buyers for agreements such as
GATT and GATS, whereas it would be simpler to list procuring
agencies rather than the myriad of items procured by govern-
ments for purposes of the AGP.' 25 Another possibility relates to
sovereignty. Three comparisons between the AGP and the
GATT and GATS illustrate how the AGP's focus on procuring
entities has ramifications for member sovereignty.
First, agreements such as GATT and GATS relate to gov-
ernment intervention in private sector trade.1 26 Their emphasis
is on preventing governments from dictating how private enter-
prises conduct their business rather than on mandating how the
government may spend. The very nature of the prohibition is
therefore less intrusive on government decision-making powers
and sovereignty. In contrast, a finite list of procuring entities
which must adhere to the mandates of the AGP permits signato-
ries to choose the level of intrusion. To list goods, supplies, and
services instead of procuring entities could more indiscrimi-
nately impinge upon sovereignty in government procurement.
Second, the general timbre of GATT, for example, is toward
more universal coverage of trade in products. The best example
of this is the general obligation of unconditional MFN treat-
ment. 27 For specific obligations taken under GATT, however,
only those contained in the Article II Schedules of Concessions
are brought within the purview of GATT.128 GATT does not con-
tain any specific duty on the part of signatories to list all goods
moving in international trade in the Schedules of Concessions.
125. Early in discussions of procurement policy under the auspices of the
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a sectoral ap-
proach suggested by the United States was rejected. See Morton Pomeranz,
Toward a New International Order in Government Procurement, 11 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1263, 1276 (1979). The level of government ownership in vari-
ous sectors such as telecommunications and utilities varied greatly between
countries such that sectoral coverage would lead to disparate obligations. Id.
126. Fried, supra note 14, at 41-42.
127. Unconditional MFN, which is the form that GATT adopted, applies to
all trade in products regardless whether a specific commitment is undertaken
thereon. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 13, §§ 10.1, at 204; see also A
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS, § I-2.4(b), at 54
(Walter Sterling Surrey & Don Wallace Jr. eds., 2d ed. 1977).
128. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 13, § 10.2, at 205.
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Moreover, there is no a priori limit on the level of protectionism
afforded via tariff at the time when an item is listed in the
Schedules. 129 Instead, the tariff level chosen becomes "bound"
and is thereafter subject to reduction during subsequent negoti-
ating rounds over trade liberalization. 130 This initial flexibility
of tariff levels, at least with regard to specific commitments,
makes the consequences of participation less severe, which
would theoretically ease fear of listing virtually all goods in the
Schedules. 13' On the other hand, GATT contains a specific com-
mitment of its participants to convert any quantitative restric-
tions on imports into tariffs. 32 This "tariffication" is not limited
to items in the Schedules; 3 3 general tariffication of all barriers
to international trade greatly facilitates negotiation over inclu-
sion of previously unbound items. As noted in the last para-
graph, the structure of the AGP does not entail the same degree
of universality of coverage.
A third difference between GATT and the AGP is the lack of
MFN treatment in the latter.134 The lack of reciprocity in GATT
in light of its generalized, unconditional MFN obligation indi-
cates a desire for universality of coverage notwithstanding the
129. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM 3 (1987).
130. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 13, §10.2, at 205; A LAWYER'S
GUIDE, supra note 127, § 1-2.4(a), at 52-53.
131. On the other hand, unconditional MFN does require that any conces-
sion undertaken, whether in the Schedules or not, must be extended to all
GATT Contracting Parties. While this has the feature of reducing overall trade
barriers generally, it could discourage Parties to the Agreement from undertak-
ing any commitments. See A LAWYER'S GUIDE, supra note 127, § 1-2.4(b), at 54.
Allowing for an initial level of tariff preference in a bound concession, however,
would reduce fear of giving up too much by participating in GATT.
In regard to government procurement concessions granted to developing
and least-developed countries under the AGP, the MFN obligation to other sig-
natories may now be suspended. See infra note 156. Otherwise, developed
countries would be hesitant to offer a valuable procurement concession to a de-
veloping or least-developed country for fear of having to provide the benefits to
all AGP signatories.
132. GATT, supra note 12, art. XI, 1.
133. Cf supra notes 127, 128 and accompanying text (explaining that MFN
is a general obligation while other obligations are specific, arising only when a
specific commitment is listed in the Schedules of Concessions). Article XI no-
where limits coverage to items listed in the Article II Schedules. Rather, Article
XI:2 contains a list of exceptions which suspend the obligation either temporar-
ily in order to prevent critical shortages, for reasons related to public safety and
general police powers of the government (standards and regulations), or for rea-
sons related to agricultural or fisheries products.
134. See generally Pomeranz, supra note 125, at 1276 (discussing negotia-
tions leading up to creation of the AGP in 1979).
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losses a participating country could endure in the face of signa-
tories that benefit from concessions made by other countries but
fail to grant their own. 135 Without MFN treatment, the benefits
of commitments taken under the AGP accrue only to signatories
of the Agreement. 136 This not only avoids the "free-rider" prob-
lem, but it also functions as an inducement for non-signatories
to join the AGP. Moreover, participants of the AGP would theo-
retically be more likely to increase the level of their commit-
ments as the pool of beneficiaries, at least in the short run, is
significantly less extensive than is the case for full WTO disci-
plines with their MFN obligations. Despite these differences,
however, participation in the AGP by the signatories themselves
has not been particularly encouraging, 37 and the level of resist-
ance from non-signatories is significant. 138 In short, the first
and best line of defense for the protection of sovereignty in gov-
ernment procurement utilized by non-members is the decision
not to participate.' 3 9
B. SPECIFIC AGP PROVISIONS
An initial indication of the AGP's impact on sovereignty be-
gins in its Preamble, where use of words and phrases such as
"should not," "it is desirable," and "at the highest possible level"
are used instead of more substantially assertive terms such as
135. One example of how far developed countries would go to ensure univer-
sality of coverage, as opposed to country participation, is illustrated by accept-
ance of "contributions" from developing countries during the Kennedy Round of
GATT negotiations in the form of promises to bind existing rates of duties
against increase rather than of reduced tariff rates of bound items.
136. See Bernard M. Hoekman & Robert M. Stern, An Assessment of the To-
kyo Round Agreements and Arrangements, in THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYS-
TEM: AN ANALYSIS AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 63, 83-84 (Robert M. Stem, ed.
1993).
137. Prior to the new AGP, member country participation in the former
agreement was said to encompass roughly ten percent of all government pro-
curement. See H.R. REP. No. 101-989, at 5 (1990). However, it has been esti-
mated that after the new AGP and conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the value
of contracts covered has increased tenfold. Gerard de Graaf & Matthew King,
Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the
GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay
Round, 29 INT'L LAW. 435, 436 (1995); Arrowsmith, Third Country Access, supra
note 100, at 27.
138. See Weiss, supra note 79, at 312 (noting "dogged" resistance to greater
liberalization in public procurement).
139. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
note 129, at 26 ("[lIt is always harder for a government to walk out of a negotia-
tion than it is to refuse to join.").
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"shall."140 Another revealing feature of the Preamble is that the
intention to avoid domestic protectionism precedes the desirabil-
ity of transparency of laws, regulations, procedures, and prac-
tices.141 The Preamble's fifth general principle is recognition of
"the need to take into account the development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries, in particular the least-de-
veloped countries."142
Following the primary limitations of the AGP as mentioned
above, i.e., the scope and coverage provisions in Art. I as applied
to entities listed in Appendix I, the first major indication of a
limit to the AGP's reach is the denial of application to "customs
duties and charges of any kind..., the method of levying [them],
other import regulations and formalities, and measures affect-
ing trade in services other than laws, regulations, procedures
and practices [falling within the purview of the AGPI."143 Inclu-
sion of this language is likely a response to concerns over possi-
ble overreaching.
Article V contains the major provisions on special and differ-
ential treatment for developing and least developed countries.
Signatories are directed to "take into account the development,
financial and trade needs" of these countries. 44 This considera-
tion is supplemented by a host of provisions common to other
WTO Agreements such as GATT. The first consideration for dif-
ferential treatment is to safeguard balance-of-payments con-
cerns in order to ensure reserves necessary to national economic
development programs. 145 The second recognizes the need to
promote domestic industries in important sectors of the econ-
omy, including small scale and cottage industries in less devel-
oped areas of a country.146 A third situation requiring
differential treatment is the support of industrial units wholly or
substantially dependent on government procurement. 147 Article
V also directs AGP signatories to encourage economic develop-
ment through regional or global arrangements acceptable to the
140. AGP, supra note 8, preamble 2-4.
141. Id. 91 2-3.
142. Id. T 5.
143. AGP, supra note 8, art. III, 3.
144. Id. art. V, 1 1. Article V differentiates between developing and least-
developed countries by calling for particular attention to the needs of the latter.
Id.
145. Id. art. V, 9 1(a).
146. Id. art. V, I l(b).
147. AGP, supra note 8, art. V, I 1(c). It is possible that this provision is
intended to facilitate privatization where such would require gradual with-
drawal of government support for success.
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Ministerial Conference of the WTO. 148 In addition, developed
country signatories are instructed to facilitate increased imports
from developing and least-developed countries. 149 The two sub-
sections of Art. V containing these five provisions, entitled
"Objectives," do not specifically require that the beneficiaries of
these policies are parties to the Agreement.
The remaining subsections in Art. V indicate more clearly
that they relate to developing and least-developed parties to the
Agreement.15 0 Article V:3 calls for developed countries to take
special consideration of the development, financial, and trade
needs of developing and least-developed countries when negoti-
ating and preparing their country lists in Appendix 1.151 Devel-
oped countries are also directed to endeavor to include in their
lists those procuring entities tending to purchase products and
services of export interest to developing countries.152 Develop-
ing countries may negotiate exclusions to national treatment by
agreement with developed countries.153 Countries entitled to
special treatment may also modify any commitments under-
taken in regard to the Agreement.154 Finally, developing coun-
tries are entitled to technical assistance from developed country
parties. 155
There is also a distinction in Art. V between developing and
least-developed countries. While the first eleven subsections
148. Id. art. V, I 1(d). There are two good examples of preferential, regional
procurement policy. The first is found in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), which grants a two and one-half percent price preference to
bidders of member countries in government procurement. UNDERSTANDING
ASEAN 285 (Alison Broinowski ed., 1982). The second is in an agreement be-
tween the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Under this agreement, member
bids must be given at least a 10% price priority over non-member bids. See
Council of Ministers' Decision No. 139 Concerning Implementation of Unified
Rules For Giving Priority in Government Purchases to National Products and
Products of National Origin in the Gulf Council States, art. 2(a) (Feb. 23, 1987),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Mdeast File.
149. AGP, supra note 8, art. V, 2.
150. Id. art. V, 3-15. These subsections make clear that assistance to
and consideration of the special needs of developing and least-developed coun-
tries is appropriate. They do not, however, describe any specifics regarding ob-
ligations or levels of aid, nor do they tend to impose a collective duty on the
signatories. Id.
151. Id. art. V, T 3.
152. Id.
153. AGP, supra note 8, art. V, T 4.
154. Id. art. V, 5. These modifications must be made according to the re-
quirements of Article XXIV:6 or by special agreement with the Committee on
Government Procurement. Id.
155. Id. art. V, It 8-10.
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concentrate on developing countries, subsections 12 and 13 spe-
cifically address least-developed countries. Subsection 12 calls
attention to a GATT 1947 Decision of the Contracting Parties for
affording special treatment to least-developed member coun-
tries. 156 It also permits signatories to grant AGP benefits to
non-member, least-developed countries. 157 Developed country
signatories must also provide assistance, including assistance in
compliance with technical regulations and standards, to poten-
tial bidders from least developed countries upon request. 158
Article V concludes by calling for the Committee on Govern-
ment Procurement to conduct annual reviews of the operation
and effectiveness of the Article, 159 and encouraging developing
country signatories to consider the possibility of extending their
Appendix I coverage with regard to any changes in their eco-
nomic, financial, and trade situations. 60
While Article XVI proscribes the use of offsets,' 6 ' it does
permit developing countries acceding to the Agreement to nego-
tiate offsets under certain conditions: 1) the conditions may only
be used for qualification to participate in the procurement pro-
cess and not as criteria for making the award; 2) the conditions
must be objective, clearly defined, and non-discriminatory; and
3) they must be set forth in the country's Appendix.' 62
The AGP's remedy provisions are also of major importance.
Award challenges are to be handled by a country court or other
impartial and independent review body (i.e., internal review), al-
beit with qualifications regarding the nature of review as a mat-
ter of first instance. 163 Under Art. XXII, if a bid challenge is not
156. Id. art. V, 12 (referring to Differential and More Favorable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979,
GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980)). The cited decision mandates that
developed countries must "exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any conces-
sions or contributions for commitments [by least-developed countries]." Differ-
ential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 6, at 204
(1980). The decision also specifically negates any intention of the developed
countries to expect some form of reciprocity in liberalization from developing
countries and permits suspension of the MFN obligation otherwise operative
when favor is paid to developing countries. Id. 9 5-6, at 204.
157. AGP, supra note 8, art. V, 12.
158. Id. art. V, 13.
159. Id. art. V, 14.
160. Id. art. V, 15.
161. Id. art. XVI, 11.
162. AGP, supra note 8, art. XVI, 2.
163. Id. art. XX, 1 2-7. For a discussion of remedies under the AGP, see
Mary Footer, Remedies Under the New GATT Agreement on Government Pro-
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adequately resolved by a tribunal in the procuring country, the
dispute may be taken to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body.
The dispute settlement provisions of the AGP are used in con-
junction with those of the DSU, but with two differences: they
provide for a decision within twenty days of a DSB's establish-
ment, 164 and remedies of national reviewing bodies may be lim-
ited to the costs of bid preparation or protest. 165
Other major provisions of the AGP which respect national
sovereignty and are applicable to all signatories are contained in
Article XXIII. Parties may take action or withhold information
for the purpose of protecting essential security interests indis-
pensably related to arms, ammunition, and war materials; to
national security; or to national defense.1 66 As long as protec-
tive measures are not arbitrary, unjustifiably discriminatory, or
disguised restrictions on international trade, the signatories
may also take special measures for the protection of morals, or-
der or safety, the life and health of humans, animals and plants,
intellectual property, or procurements involving handicapped
persons, philanthropic institutions, or prison labor. 167 Finally,
the parties may deny the application of their obligations under
the Agreement to particular counties also members if such in-
tent is manifested either at the time of acceptance of obligations
or upon the accession of a new party thereto. 168
curement, 4 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 80 (1995). A new feature of this bid
challenge system is the ability of a private individual, rather than the individ-
ual's country, to seek and receive a remedy. Ordinarily, it is the country which
brings a challenge to the WTO (and to the GATT Secretariat before the exist-
ence of the WTO). See also Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The
WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declin-
ing Membership?, 4 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 63, 69-73 (1995) (describing en-
forcement mechanisms in the AGP).
164. AGP, supra note 8, art. XXII, 4. The alacrity with which decisions
are to be made for purposes of this Article, as well as for those of the national
reviewing bodies of Article XX, is based on the nature of government procure-
ment. If a contract is awarded and work begins, it is very difficult to rescind in
favor of the frustrated bidder. The successful bidder may have begun perform-
ance in reliance on the contract, and in the case of large construction or supply
contracts, may have even involved subcontractors with which it has some con-
tractual obligation. Speed is required if an improper bid is to be set aside, to
prevent any detrimental reliance thereon.
165. Id. art. XX, 7(c).
166. Id. art. XXIII, 1.
167. Id. art. XXIII, 2.
168. AGP, supra note 8, art. XXIV, 11.
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III. ANALYSIS
The AGP contains the several exceptions to coverage for
matters of national defense and sensitive public protection con-
cerns. Article V of the AGP contains a list of familiar GATT-
styled matters to which developed country signatories are to be
sensitive. 169 The AGP does not specifically provide for "secon-
dary" concerns 170 related to matters such as industrial develop-
ment policy, national employment concerns, and social policies
other than those regarding the handicapped, philanthropic insti-
tutions, and prison labor. Instead, there are generalized provi-
sions taking into account the "development, financial and trade"
needs of developing and least-developed countries' 7 ' that im-
pose an individual rather than a collective obligation on devel-
oped-country signatories. In short, the AGP does not
institutionalize the type of protection afforded the secondary
concerns of developing and least-developed countries, in the
manner of the GATT. The response of many countries is non-
participation; for signatories, it is a reluctance to increase cover-
age in Appendix I's list of procuring entities subject to AGP pro-
visions. These ongoing problems demonstrate that it may be
time to re-think the structure of the AGP.
The inefficacy of the AGP as presently organized is under-
scored by a recent indication of U.S. policy that increased partic-
ipation in the AGP by countries that have not yet signed the
Agreement is not feasible in the short run.172 Citing the view
169. Id. art. V, 1 1. The GATT contains four major suspensions of obliga-
tion, known as "safeguard" or "escape" clauses: Article XII (Balance of Pay-
ments); Article XIX ("temporary" Emergency Actions on Imports for situations
that may cause "serious injury" to domestic products); Article XX (General Ex-
ceptions, i.e., protection of life, health and morals provisions); and Article XXI
(Security Exceptions). See GATT, supra note 12, arts. XII, XIX, XX-XXI. The
reason why these provisions are included in the GATT, and the AGP for devel-
oping and least-developed countries but not for developed-country signatories,
is presumably that GATT coverage is intended to be more universal, whereas
AGP coverage arises for only the limited number of procuring entities listed.
Developed country signatories of may obviate the necessity of GATT-styled es-
cape clauses by limiting the number and type of procuring entities contained in
Appendix I of the AGP.
170. See supra note 95.
171. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
172. See United States Trade Representative, U.S. Nonpaper on WTO Gov-
ernment Procurement, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 22, 1996, at 30. See
also Developing Countries Cool to U.S. WTO Procurement Proposal, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 21, 1996, at 1, 34-35 (noting caution of many countries regarding
the scope and purpose of such an agreement). United States Trade Representa-
tive, Further Ideas on a WTO Government Procurement Initiative: Second Non-
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that AGP requirements are "too administratively rigid and bur-
densome,"17 3 the short-term focus is on "transparency, openness
and due process," which will in turn facilitate progressive appli-
cation of the AGP's national treatment and market access obli-
gations.' 74 In addition, U.S. Trade Ambassador Michael Kantor
recently delivered a speech indicating that the AGP is "exces-
sively rigorous," and stating an intention to promote "trans-
parency and due process in . . . government procurement
activities."175 The fact that transparency was viewed as the
"key mechanism" for improvement in international procurement
opportunity in the 1979 version of the AGP176 underscores the
lack of significant progress in overall liberalization under the
AGP.
The AGP Members and the Committee on Government Pro-
curement should consider creating a side-agreement or new an-
nex to the AGP which permits the use of domestic price
preferences by developing and least-developed countries in order
to induce increased participation in the Agreement. 7 7 World
Bank institutions generally permit domestic price preferences,
which is consistent with their policy of emphasizing the develop-
ment of infrastructure and competitive capacity rather than
pure competition.178 When members of a new Agreement are in
Paper from the United States Delegation, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, June
21, 1996, at 35-36.
173. United States Trade Representative, U.S. Nonpaper on WTO Govern-
ment Procurement, supra note 172, at 31.
174. Id.
175. Michael Kantor, Remarks Prepared for Delivery, Emergency Commit-
tee for American Trade (March 6, 1996) (on file with the MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE) (focusing on bribery and corruption generally within the context of the
United State's international trade position).
176. See, e.g., David V. Anthony & Carol K. Hagerty, Cautious Optimism as
a Guide to Foreign Government Procurement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1301,
1323-27 (1979).
177. Several authors have already raised the possibility of this option as a
way to increase participation in the AGP. See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra
note 163, at 76-77; Paul Carrier, Domestic Price Preferences in Public Purchas-
ing: An Overview and Proposal of Amendment to the Agreement on Government
Procurement, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
178. See, e.g.,WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS
AND IDA CREDrrs app. 2, cl. 5 & 7, at 49-50 (1995) (providing for up to a fifteen
percent preference for domestic manufactures, and up to seven and one-half
percent in cases of works contracts in countries where Gross National Product
falls below a specified threshold). An exception is the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development, which does not include any provisions on do-
mestic price preferences. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTIT-
UENT AGREEMENT 57 & n.19 (1992).
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a better competitive position, they or certain of their procuring
entities can be graduated to the AGP as presently formulated.
No matter how the levels of price preference are set, this would
provide countries that have not signed the Agreement with a
level of discretion that would ease fears over the complete loss of
sovereignty. The benefits to signatories would include the fol-
lowing: 1) more countries would be subject to concerted interna-
tional efforts toward further liberalization of procurement under
the auspices of the AGP and ultimately, of the WTO; 2) more
procuring entities of every participant, and eventually, of all
WTO Members, would be subjected to AGP-style practices and
regulations; 3) the forms of protectionism could be limited to
price preferences, to the exclusion of other mechanisms such as
offsets and technical specifications, 4) the levels of protectionism
would be capped at the levels of preference, thereby permitting
the benefits of free trade and specialization to operate above the
levels of preference; 5) procurement systems would naturally be-
come more transparent as participation increases; and 6) there
would be a more solid, multilateral framework upon which fur-
ther negotiations would be based. In the long run, international
government procurement could more quickly be brought under a
truly multilateral structure, which in turn would qualify it as a
full WTO discipline.
At first blush, a proposal of this nature may seem radical.
To the contrary, this proposal is based on the workings of GATT,
where "tariffication" is replaced by the domestic price prefer-
ence. The GATT system has been tremendously successful:
world-wide tariff levels have fallen from a World War II-era
forty percent to a current level of approximately five percent, 179
and includes a majority of nations as signatories. Unlike GATT,
however, the AGP has only added a handful of new signatories
since its inception fifteen years ago. This lack of participation
signals a problem. Changes made to the AGP during the Uru-
guay Round have increased coverage over more government
purchasing entities, yet this coverage is between the original
cast of players. It could be argued that AGP Art. V:4 may ease
fears over the loss of sovereignty by permitting countries to ne-
gotiate exceptions to national treatment and to list the deroga-
tions in their Appendix. Exclusions of this nature appear to be
the exception rather than the rule, however.' 80 Initially permit-
ting price preferences generally, with a concomittant obligation
179. THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 706 & n.4.
180. But cf. supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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to lower preference levels during subsequent negotiations,
would more adequately address concerns that have kept devel-
oping and least-developed countries outside the fold.
CONCLUSION
Despite increased coverage of the AGP over procuring enti-
ties in signatory countries, the level of country participation has
not increased significantly since inception of the AGP in 1981.
Gains are being made in regional arrangements, but it is by no
means certain whether they will translate into multilateral im-
provements under the auspices of the AGP. An amendment to
the AGP, allowing a certain degree of protectionism in public
purchasing ab initio, would result in increased participation by
developing and least-developed countries. If successful, the
long-term benefits should exceed any short-term difficulties or
setbacks. Moreover, the proposed amendment to the AGP would
utilize a system with which most countries are familiar: one
analgous to the GATT and its system of tariffication. The suc-
cess of the GATT in lowering tariffs world-wide bodes well for
the use of a similar system in government procurement target-
ing price preferences in lieu of tariff levels. This system could be
a workable compromise between the goal of trade liberalization
and concerns over sovereignty which have historically prevented
participation in the AGP.
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